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INTRODUCTION

Money is the fundamental device by which modem industrial
Practically speaking, without its existence,
economies flourish.
decentralized decision-making by autonomous individuals regarding
Functionally
their economic activities would not be possible.
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speaking, money is: (1) a medium of exchange; (2) a unit of measure
of relative worth; and (3) a store of value of current earnings for
spending in the future. Throughout history,2 money has taken
many forms, evolving from shells, to precious metals, to stamped
metals, to paper certificates redeemable for metals, to non-redeemable paper certificates or fiat money.3 To the extent that "electronic
currency" may embody new forms of exchange, measurement, and
storage, it is plausible to suggest that electronic currency could
represent the next stage of monetary evolution.
At present, however, it is more accurate to describe the majority of
the emerging technologies popularly labeled electronic currency as
new configurations of the existing payment system. Payment systems
are the means by which money is transferred between users and
suppliers of funds.4 Currently, there are systems in which goods and
services are exchanged for cash, paper checks, debit authorizations,
In the banking and
credit authorizations, and wire transfers.
commercial communities, the term wire transfer applies primarily to
large-dollar, commercial wire transfer systems that have been
highly automated for several years.' In contrast, our discussion of
electronic currency focuses on the development of retail payment
systems that involve electronic transactions initiated by consumers
through the use of stored value products. Although stored value
payment products have long existed as traveler's checks, gift certificates, and mass transit tokens, they now are being offered as
magnetic-stripe cards, 6 "smart" cards, 7 and software-only digital
1. See THOMAS P. FITCH, DICTIONARY OF BANKING TERMS 391 (1990); EDUCATION POLICY
& DEVELOPMENT, AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, BANKING TERMINOLOGY 231 (3d ed. 1989);

cf U.C.C. § 1-201(24) (1990) (defining money more narrowly as "[a] medium of exchange
authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign government as part of its currency").
2. For a thoughtful discussion on the historical evolution of money, see E. VICTOR
MORGAN, A HISTORY OF MONEY 9-79 (1965).
3. "Fiat money" is that which is backed only by the issuing government's decree that it is
acceptable as legal tender for all debts. See FITCH, supra note 1, at 244.
4. See id. at 456.
5. See generally DONALD I. BAKER & ROLAND E. BRANDEL, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC FUND
TRANSFER SYSTEMS 1 1.03 (rev. ed. 1996). Commercial, or wholesale, wire transfer systems
include Fedwire, Clearing House Interbank Payments Systems ("CHIPS"), Society for Worldwide
Interbank Payments Systems ("SWIFT"), and Telex. See id. 1.032[9].
6. Magnetic stripe cards are traditional credit cards that provide limited read-only data in
magnetic form.
7. The French banking industry first introduced smart cards, also known as chip cards, in
the early 1980s as replacements for magnetic stripe cards. Armed with small microprocessors
and memory, smart cards allow for exchange of data between the cards and electronic readers.
Smart cards offer advantages such as ten times longer life than traditional magnetic stripe cards;
they allow for greater security features, and they can be used more readily on the Internet
because their memory can contain payment authorization as well as verification information.
See generally Paul Taylor & Tom Forenski, Smart Cards' Time Has Come, THE FIN. POST, Oct. 26,
1996, at C20.
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coins.' Thus, for our purposes, electronic currency is any payment
system in which exchanges for goods or services, or both, are initiated
by consumers via electronic transmissions originating from a stored
value product.9
It is apparent that existing banking, finance, and consumer
protection laws may prove inadequate to regulate the many electorate
currency systems currently under development.
The Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) provides for the rights and obligations of
the participants in paper-based ° and wholesale wire transfer sys-2
tems,11 and for the issuers and holders of negotiable instruments,
letters of credit, 3 securities," and warehouse receipts.15 The
Electronic Funds Transfer Act of 1978 ("EFTA")' 6 and Regulation
E 7 represent the primary federal law governing consumer rights in
electronic fund transfers ("EFT7") transactions that involve a consumer
asset account.' 8 Further, provisions of the Truth in Lending

8. Digital coins, also known as e-coins, constitute units of currency electronically
downloaded to software on a computer hard drive. They provide security through password

protection embodied in the software program, allow for anonymous purchases unlike traditional
credit cards, and can be spent in small denominations, even fractions of a cent. Some see
digital coins as a logical monetary unit for the Internet that will allow for anonymous purchasing
as well as low-level access charges for web sites. See generally Gregg Keizer, Digital Coins,
COMPUTER LIFE, Dec. 12, 1996, at 68.
9. This definition does not include PC home banking or electronic bill payment programs
that simply involve the use of new devices to access traditional consumer deposit or credit
accounts. Specific commercial payment systems that meet our definition of electronic currency
include: Mondex, see Mondex Int'l (visited Feb. 11, 1996) <http://www.mondex.com> (on file
with The American University Law Review); Visa Cash, see Tomorrow (visited Feb. 11, 1996)
<http://www.visa.com/cgi-bin/vee/sf/cashmain.html> (on file with The American University Law
Review); Digicash, see Ecash Home Page (visited Feb. 11, 1996) <http://www.digicash.com/
ecash/ecash-home.hnml> (on file with TheAmerican UniversityLaw Review); Cybercash, see Shoppers
(visited Feb. 11, 1996) <http://www.cybercash.com/cybercash/shoppers/> (on file with The
American University Law Review); and Citicorp's Electronic Monetary System, seejennifer Kingson
Bloom, Citicorp Sets Its Sights on a Virtual Greenback AM. BANKER, Mar. 18, 1996, at 10A, 12A.
10. Article 3 covers commercial paper and Article 4 covers bank deposits and collections.
See generally BAKER & BRANDEL, supra note 5, 1 12.02[1].
11. See U.C.C. art. 4A (1990). Although the scope of Article 4A also extends to automated
clearinghouse ("ACH") credit transfers, its primary purpose is to define the rights and
obligations of parties to what the commercial community considers wholesale wire transfers. See
BAKER & BRANDEL, supranote 5, 1 13.01.
12. See U.C.C. art. 3. This article expressly excludes from its coverage money, payment
orders governed by Article 4A, and securities governed by Article 8. See id. § 3-102.
13. See id. art. 5.
14. See idart. 7.
15. See id.§§ 7-501 to -509.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (1994). A number of states have enacted EFT laws that generally
follow the federal act See, e.g., IOWA CODE ch. 527 (1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 23.1137 (1979);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-16 (Michie 1996).
17. 12 C.F.R. pt. 205 (1996).
18. An "account" for EFTA purposes is "a demand deposit (checking), savings, or other
consumer asset account ... held ... by a financial institution and established primarily for
personal, family, or household use." Id. § 205.2(b). See generally BAKER & BRANDEL, supranote
5, 12.04. For a detailed discussion of the EFTA and Regulation E, see infranotes 88-110 and
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Act,19 the Equal Credit Opportunity Act,20 the Fair Credit Reporting
Act, 2' the Privacy Act of 1974,22 the Right to Financial Privacy Act
of 1978,2' and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 24 govern
certain aspects of retail EFT transactions. Nonetheless, this abundance of statutory and administrative law concerning retail banking
and the electronic transfer of funds by or on behalf of consumers fails
to provide answers to many pressing legal questions raised by the
emergence of electronic currency.
Although the situation may appear problematic at first glance,
powerful analytical models exist that can help both policy makers and
electronic currency designers fill the gaps in the law revealed by this
rapidly changing technological landscape, so as to permit electronic
transactions to occur in a responsible, orderly, and reliable manner.
When addressing electronic currency, policy makers must choose from
two basic approaches: (1) attempt to superimpose a comprehensive
legal scheme over electronic currency (either by creating a completely
new system or by adapting an existing system); or (2) analogize to
existing payment methods and commercial relationships and allow
private parties to supplement as needed with contract terms specific
to the situation. The former path is fraught with weaknesses-the
most obvious difficulty being the inability of law makers and regulators to keep up with the current pace of technological innovation and
commercial application. By the time laws or regulations can be
written and implemented, they almost certainly will be behind the
technological development curve. Regulatory micro-management
simply presents too great a risk of either stifling development or
unwittingly steering it in unwanted directions. By making analogies
to existing payment methods, all interested parties-government,
issuers, and users-will benefit from vast stores of knowledge and
expectations gained from decades of experience. Further, private
contract law is capable of supplementing existing analogues whenever
electronic currency poses a unique problem.
Part I of this Article reviews several legal and regulatory issues for
which contemporary legal policy makers appear poised to offer

accompanying text.
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 601-1667e.
20. Id. § 1691.
21. Id. §§ 1681-1681u.
22. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994).
23. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1994).
24. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 18 U.S.C.).
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industry-wide solutions. These are issues that traditionally have been
addressed at an institutional, rather than a transactional, level.
Concerns with the integrity of the payment system, the safety and
soundness of financial services industry participants, and the common
conduct and practices of these participants are most prominent in this
category. In general, the policies adopted with regard to these issues
will shape the regulatory and competitive environment of the
electronic currency industry for the foreseeable future.
Part II of this Article examines several consumer-related issues that
are driven by consumer protection concerns and that traditionally
have been addressed with transactionaly-focused solutions. When
possible, Part II analyzes how the issues raised in this Article are being
addressed or how it appears they will be addressed in the future.
Where there is an absence of signals or guideposts, Part II offers
insight into potential effects on industry participants.25
Part III of this Article examines the origins of legal expectations for
existing payment instruments, including cash, checks, automated
teller machine ("ATM") cards, traveler's checks, and credit cards.
Based on the insight gained from this analysis, this Article concludes
by recommending a course of action consisting of: (1) a minimum
amount of legal regulation, limited to protection of the existing
payment system, the safety and soundness of issuers, and general
consumer interests; and (2) a reliance on the strength of the common
law and private contracts to supplement this basic legal superstructure
when necessary.
I.

A.

INSTITUTION-RELATED ISSUES

Authority to Issue Electronic Currency

A threshold institution-related issue is whether the sale of electronic
currency is paramount to a usurpation of the exclusive authority of
the U.S. government to issue currency. For example, a literal reading
of the Stamp Payments Act of 1862 ("SPA") 21 may lead some

25. Because this Article focuses on legal issues particular to electronic currency, it does not
address issues that are applicable more generally to the entire field of electronic commerce (e.g.,
conflict of laws, statutes offrauds, digital signature legislation, encryption technology policy, sales
and income taxation, intellectual property, and antitrust strategies for network industries).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 336. The Act provides:
Whoever makes, issues, circulates, or pays out any note, check, memorandum, token,
or other obligation for a less sum than $1, intended to circulate as money or to be
received or used in lieu of lawful money of the United States, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.

1110

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1105

commentators to believe that the issuance of electronic currency
potentially amounts to a federal crime punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both."

Outside the halls of academia, the proposition that

electronic currency issuance comes dangerously close to violating this
criminal prohibition is tenuous at best.

Single and limited-purpose electronic currencies are likely to be
deemed beyond the scope of the SPA. There is no violation if a
negotiable note, check, or draft is passed in payment of debt or in the
purchase of goods in the course of a commercial transaction, unless
it is intended for common circulation."

Electronic currency

products that are redeemable for goods and services (but not for
cash) are not intended for common circulation,29 and therefore
probably are not prohibited by the SPA.
The SPA may be inapplicable to all forms of electronic currency,

because such currencies lack the physical characteristics of U.S.
currency. Instruments that do not have the physical characteristics of
U.S. coins or paper currency cannot be "intended to circulate as

money.""0 No electronic currency products possess the physical
properties of coins or paper currency. In fact, some forms of
electronic currency, such as digital cash, have no tangible characteristics whatsoever.

If faced with an ether-based payment system,

however, a court may dismiss the relevance of distinctions based on
physical attributes and instead may focus on similarities arising from
non-physical properties, such as the rights and obligations of the
holders.

27. By the start of the Civil War, the nation's banking and financial system was in disarray.
There was a proliferation of private-issue currencies, much of which was propagated by entities
subject to minimal government regulation and which tended to compete with government-issued
currency. See Lewis D. Solomon, Local Currency: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 59, 60-62 (1996). The Stamp Payment Act ("SPA") was one of the first attempts by
Congress during this period to stabilize the national currency problem. Other measures soon
followed, the most notable being the National Currency Act of 1863, also known as the National
Bank Act of 1863, which created the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and empowered
the Comptroller to supervise the "issue and regulation of a national currency secured by United
States bonds." 12 Stat. 665 (1863).
28. See United States v. Van Auken, 96 U.S. 366, 368 (1877); cf. Stettinius v. United States,
22 F. Cas. 1322, 1325 (C.C.D.C. 1839) (No. 13,387) (interpreting District of Columbia statute
similar to SPA).
29. Cf Van Auken, 96 U.S. at 368-69 (holding that notes payable in goods were intended to
circulate only as goods and not as money); United States v. Gellman, 44 F. Supp. 360, 365 (D.
Minn. 1942) (holding that statute was enacted more than 100 years ago and was "never framed
to embrace the use of metal tokens [in vending machines] as a substitution for money"); United
States v. Monongahela Bridge Co., 26 F. Cas. 1292, 1293 (W.D. Pa. 1863) (No. 15,796) (holding
that tickets issued by bridge company marked "good for one trip" were not violative of
counterfeit laws, in part, because tickets contained no promise to pay money).
30. United States v. Roussopulous, 95 F. 977, 978 (D. Minn. 1899); accord Monongahela
Bridge Co., 26 F. Cas. at 1292.
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In many cases, an analysis of non-physical attributes leads to the
reasonable conclusion that even multi-purpose electronic currency,
redeemable for goods, services, and cash, would not be prohibited by
the SPA-as long as it was designed to resemble functionally an
existing payment product. For example, paper-based, multi-purpose
payment products have existed since 1891 in the form of traveler's
checks.3 1 The century-long acquiescence of the federal government
to the use of this device, and to similar payment instruments, strongly
suggests that issuance of electronic variants of the same will not be
thwarted via prosecution under this Civil War Era criminal prohibition. Indeed, a substantial body of common law has developed
around instruments such as traveler's checks, as well as their contractual underpinnings, that can provide further models for differentiation from the proscriptions of the SPA. Thus, from a practical
perspective, it is apparent that electronic currency developers should
not be overly concerned with the threat of monetary fines or
incarceration resulting from a charge of expropriating the federal
government's exclusive power to issue currency.
Beyond questions arising from the federal government's exclusive
right to issue currency is the related inquiry of whether electronic
currency issuance amounts to the taking of deposits, which is within
the exclusive province of fully-authorized financial institutions. 2
The question of who will be permitted to issue electronic currency is
important for policy makers, because restricting this authority
represents an irresistibly simple solution to many difficult problems.
For example, if issuance is limited to deposit-taking institutions: (1)
there will be no question which government authority (i.e., financial
or communications) possesses primary regulatory responsibility; (2)
the existing regulatory agencies whose charge is to protect the safety
and soundness of the payment system will have legitimate authority to
monitor issuers; and (3) consumers and merchants will be able to rely
on well-developed expectations regarding their relationships with
financial institutions.
Despite the substantial administrative advantages to issuance
restriction, U.S. policy makers have been, to this point, reluctant to

31. The American Express Company created the traveler's check in 1891 in response to the
need for an instrument that provides the convenience and marketability of cash and the safety
of a letter of credit. See William D. Hawkland, American Traveler's Checks, 15 BuFF. L. REv. 501,
501 (1966).
32. See Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. DM-329, 1995 WL 145055 at *2 (Mar. 9, 1995) (responding to

questions of whether debit card programs are statutorily permissible, and whether entities such
as state universities issuing debit cards to students and faculty act as banks, thus requiring such

entities to obtain bank charter).
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move in this direction for a fear of disrupting the nascent development of electronic currency. At the federal level, no legislative action
has been proposed that would restrict electronic currency issuance,"3
and regulators have expressed little interest in imposing such restrictions.3

Policy makers at the state level also have demonstrated reluctance
to unduly restrict issuance rights of financial institutions. Florida,
Texas, and Idaho have addressed whether university stored value card
("SVC") programs constitute unlawful engagement in the business of
banking. 5 The Comptroller of Florida invalidated Florida State
University's Seminole Access Program, concluding that the university
paid checks by allowing cash withdrawals with the university-issued
card at ATMs operated by a private bank. 6 The Texas Attorney
General rejected such a conclusion primarily because: (1) although
a cash withdrawal from an ATM may constitute payment of a check
under the National Bank Act, 7 it does not necessarily constitute a
check under the U.C.C.; and (2) the Texas university program did not
permit cardholders to make cash withdrawals from their accounts,
much less from ATMs operated by a private bank."8 The Idaho
legislature explicitly granted universities the authority to offer
programs similar to those in Texas that permit payment cards to be
used at campus locations to redeem goods or services but not for

33. Congress, however, currently is studying the issue of electronic money. See, Ag., Hearings
on the Future of Money Before the Subcomm. on Domestic and Int'l Monetary Poly of the Comm. on
Banking and Fin. Servs., 104th Cong. (1996) [hereinafter Future of Money Hearings).
34. See, e.g., Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Remarks at the United States Treasury Conference on Electronic Money & Banking: The Role
of Government 5 (Sept. 19, 1996); Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks
Before the Exchequer Club 4 (Jan. 24, 1996). But see Barbara A. Rehm, Bank Rules Urgedfor
Stored-Value Issuers, AM. BANKER, July 30, 1996, at 2 (citing comments by I Alton Gilbert, Vice
President, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, in which he advocated requiring all SVC issuers
to obtain bank charters).
35. See Op. Tex. Att'y Gen., supra note 32, at *2; Op. Fla. Comptroller Gen. (Nov. 16, 1990)
(on file with The American University Law Review); University Debit Card Act, IDAHO CODE ch. 30
(1996). Generally, a university adds a stored-value feature to student identification cards so that
students can purchase items at campus cafeterias, bookstores, and vending machines. See Op.
Tex. Att'y Gen., supranote 32, at *2.
36. Paying checks constitutes a banking activity because, by definition, a check must be
drawn on a bank. See U.C.C. § 3-104(2) (b); Op. Tex. Att'y Gen., supra note 32, at *8.
37. 12 U.S.C. § 36(f)(1994).
38. See Op. Tex. Att'y Gen., supra note 32, at *8.
The Florida Comptroller relied, in part, on Illinois ex reL Lignoul v. Continental illinoisNat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 536 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1976), in which the court determined whether a cash
withdrawal from an ATM constituted "branch banking" under the National Bank Act. The court
held that off-premises electronic bank facilities were branch banks, and that functions carried
on through such facilities including withdrawing cash and paying installment loans constituted
branch banking. See id, at 176. Lignouldoes not apply to the Texas opinion because the latter
requires an interpretation of U.C.C. § 3-104(3) rather than of the National Bank Act.
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cash.39 At least for now, federal and state officials seem to be willing

to allow nonbanks to issue single and limited-purpose products, but
it remains unclear what legal or regulatory barriers lie ahead for
nonbank issuers of multi-purpose electronic currency.
It appears that the European Commission, in contrast, is close to
placing a limit on the issuance of electronic currency.4" This
decision-if made-will be due in large part to the general agreement
among European policy analysts that issuing electronic currency is
equivalent to taking bank deposits.4 It still is unclear, however,
whether European authorities will: (1) restrict all electronic currency
issuance to deposit-taking institutions; or (2) allow non-deposit-taking
entities to issue single- and limited-purpose payment cards, but not
multi-purpose payment cards. 2 Regardless of its ultimate policy
decision, the Commission's dialogue could lead decision makers in
the United States to impose issuance restrictions in the future.4"
B. PrudentialSupervision of Nonbank Issuers
For those who perceive a need to regulate the development and
deployment of electronic currency, allowing nonbanks to issue
electronic currency is like opening Pandora's Box. In a system devoid
of legal barriers to entry, many issuers may lie beyond the ready grasp
of banking regulators. Under current law, neither the Comptroller

39. See University Debit Card Act, IDAHO CODE §§ 26-3001 to -3004.
40. European policy initiatives are worthy of note because European firms' technological
innovations and practical applications (of smart card technology in particular) have tended to
out-pace those of U.S. firms. In general, European innovation was a necessity created by
relatively high telecommunications costs and poor infrastructure for on-line authorization of
card transactions. See BAKER & BRANDEL, supranote 5, 1 31.07[1].
41. See WORKING GROUP ON EU PAYMENT SYs., REPORT TO THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN

MONETARY INST. ON PREPAID CARDS 131 (1994) [hereinafter PREPAID CARDS] (basing conclusion
that issuing electronic currency is like taking deposits on an economic analysis of the underlying
transaction); European Commission Directorate General XV, Commission Policy Concerning
New Means of Payment 3 (June 21, 1996) (draft) [hereinafter Commission Policy] (basing
conclusion that issuing electronic currency is like taking deposits on an analysis of the banking
laws of European Union Member States). This policy decision also is driven, of course, by
legitimate concerns about: (1) the integrity of the retail payments system; (2) consumer
protection against the failure of issuers; (3) monetary policy; and (4) fair competition between
issuing institutions. See PREPAID CARDS, supra, 1 9.
42. Compare Commission Policy, supra note 41, at 3 (leaving open question of whether all
issuance should be restricted to fully authorized depository institutions), with PREPAID CARDS,
supra note 41, 1 14 (explicitly excluding single- and limited-purpose payment cards from
analysis).
43. The principal banking association in the United States also is urging restrictions on
issuance of stored-value instruments to regulated depository institutions. See Payments System
Task Force, American Bankers Association, ABA Payments System Task Force Executive Summary

(visited Nov. 10,1996) <http://www.abacom/paymenthtm> (on file with TheAmerican University
Law Review).
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of the Currency ("Comptroller")," the Board of Governors of the

Federal Reserve System ("FRB"), nor the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation ("FDIC"),46 has authority over nonbanking corporations.
Thus, the questions become: (1) Will nonbank issuers of electronic
currency be supervised in order to ensure financial stability and
adequate consumer protection?4 7 and (2) Would it be appropriate

to subject a nonbank to the same substantive or procedural rules that
were created for depository institutions? A proposition that can be
stated with relative certainty is that if nonbanks are permitted to issue
electronic currency, they cannot be subject to all banking regulations.4" This, in essence, would be paramount to restricting issuance
to deposit-taking institutions.

Even if nonbank issuers of multi-purpose electronic currency lie
beyond the grasp of financial institution regulatory authorities, they
may be subject to heightened prudential supervision under state
licensing laws. Several states have money transmitter licensing laws,4"
many of which might encompass entities that issue electronic currency
products for use in obtaining goods, services, or cash."0 Licensees
44. The Comptroller of the Currency is charged by the national banking laws with the
execution of all laws of the United States relating to the organization, operation, regulation, and
supervision of national banks and, in particular, with the execution of 12 U.S.C. § 24, which sets
forth the corporate powers of national banks. See 12 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1996); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1
(1994) (establishing Office of Comptroller of the Currency); id. § 24 (promulgating duties and
responsibilities of Office of Comptroller of the Currency and enumerating corporate powers of
national banking associations).
45. The FRB's supervisory powers and duties include, inter alia, supervising and regulating
the Federal Reserve Banks, bank holding companies, and state member banks of the Federal
Reserve System. See FREDERIC SOLOMON ET AL, BANKING LAW § 77.03[2] (1996).
46. The FDIC has authority to: (1) examine state-chartered, nonmember, depository
institutions; and (2) conduct special examinations of any depository institution for insurance
purposes. See 12 U.S.C. § 1820(a)-(b). For a thorough discussion of the FDIC's principal
supervisory powers, see SOLOMON, supra note 45, § 41.03.
47. Although the Federal Trade Commission has broad jurisdiction over many consumer
protection matters, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1994) (monopolies and combinations); itL § 45
(unfair methods of competition); id § 52 (dissemination of false advertising), it does not have
the express authority, expertise, or enforcement instruments to protect the integrity of the
payment system.
48. For example, national banks must comply with the following regulations: Investment
Securities Regulation, 12 C.F.R. pt. 1 (1996); Minimum Capital Ratios, id. pt. 3; Minimum
Security Devices and Procedures, Reports of Crimes and Suspected Crimes and Bank Secrecy
Compliance, id. pt. 21; Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, id. pt. 25; and Safety and
Soundness Standards, id. pt. 30.
49. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 6-1201 to -1219 (Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 36a-595
to -610 (1995); FLA. STAT. ch. 560 (1995); IDAHO CODE §§ 26-2901 to -2928 (Supp. 1996); 205
ILL Comp. STAT. 657 (West Supp. 1996).
50. "Money transmitter" often is defined broadly to include, inter alia, an entity that: (1)
"sells or issues payment instruments"; or (2) "engages in the business of receiving money for
transmission or transmitting money." 205 ILL. COMP. STAT. 657/5; see also ARIZ. Rev. STAT. § 61201.10. "Payment instrument" also is defined broadly enough to include many electronic
currency products. See, e.g., 205 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 657/5 ("'Payment instrument' means a
check, draft, money order, traveler's check, or other instrument or memorandum, written order
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generally are subject to investment restrictions, ' bonding requirements,52' and other similar rules. Thus, applying state money
transmitter laws to electronic currency would provide a policy option
that addresses many institution-related concerns, without barring
market entry by non-depository institutions.

C.

Monetary Policy

The emergence of new forms of electronic currency will force the
FRB to evaluate the technology's potential impact on monetary policy.
The FRB implements monetary policy through: (1) open market
5 (2)
operations, such as the buying and selling of U.S. securities;
adjustments in the discount rate charged depository institutions when
borrowing from the Federal Reserve System; and (3) the reserve
requirement.5 4 The proliferation of electronic currency could
frustrate the implementation of monetary policy by complicating the
calculation of the standard monetary aggregates. 55
Regardless of what future impact electronic currency has on
monetary policy, it raises reserve-related questions for industry
participants today. Under current law, depository institutions are
6
required to maintain reserves against their "transaction accounts."
or written receipt for the transmission or payment of money sold or issued to one or more
persons whether or not that instrument or order is negotiable."); AMz. REv. STAT. § 6-1201.12
("'Payment instrument' means a check, draft, money order, traveler's check or other instrument
or order for the transmission or payment of money sold to one or more persons whether or not
that instrument or order is negotiable.").
51. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 6-1212 (imposing market value and net carrying value
restrictions on licensees); 205 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 657/50 (imposing aggregate market value
restriction on licensees and listing "permissible investments").
52. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 6-1205 (requiring applicants to post and licensees to
maintain bond, the value of which varies according to number of authorized delegates and
locations); 205 ILL. COMP. STAT. 657/30 (requiring applicants to post and licensees to maintain
bond, ranging in value from $100,000 to $2,000,000).
53. The Federal Open Market Committee, ofwhich the FRB comprises a majority, has the
statutory authority to conduct open market operations. See SOLOMON, supra note 45,
§ 1.06[2J [a].
54.

See id.

55. Note, however, that the current FRB does not see significant issues arising in this area
in the near future.

See, e.g., Greenspan Is Low-Key About E-Cash Impact on Payment System, 15

BANKING POL'Y REP., Mar. 4-18, 1996, at 26, 27 ("'In my judgment, some of the recent speculation about risks to monetary policy... has been a bit alarmist.' (quoting FRB Chairman Alan
Greenspan)); Edward W. Kelley,Jr., Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Remarks at the Digital Commerce Conference 4 (May 6, 1996). Mr. Kelley points out that, even
if every person in the United States held $150 in electronic currency, the total value would
amount to less than $50 billion, which is insignificant relative to the current M1 monetary
aggregate of $1 trillion. See id.
56. See 12 U.S.C. § 461(b) (2) (A) (1994); Regulation D, 12 C.F.R. § 204.1(b) (1996). A
"transaction account" is a "deposit or account on which the depositor or account holder is
permitted to make withdrawals by negotiable or transferable instrument, payment orders of
withdrawal, telephone transfers, or other similar items, for the purpose of making payments or
transfers to third persons or others." 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(1)(C).
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The FRB does not have authority to require non-depository institutions
to maintain reserves for funds underlying electronic currency
accounts.57 This lack of authority creates a situation in which nondepository institutions could have an artificially-created competitive
advantage over regulated financial institutions. Thus, issuers may
have incentives to conduct their activities in non-depository institutions so they can maintain complete discretionary control over
electronic currency funds."8 This conclusion, however, assumes that
regulated financial institutions and their customers will not be
permitted to define their contractual relationships as anything other
than a "transaction account." At this time, our conclusions necessarily
are limited. If electronic currency funds are deemed to be held in
transaction accounts, financial institutions may be significantly
disadvantaged relative to non-depository institutions. 9
D. Deposit Insurance
A major concern of the electronic currency pioneers has been
whether and to what extent the funds underlying SVCs constitute
"deposits" within the meaning of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act,
("FDIA")6O and thereby qualify for deposit insurance. In a recent
legal opinion, the FDIC addressed this question with regard to funds
held by insured depository institutions. 6 The opinion states that the
funds underlying SVCs: (1) are federally insured deposits if funds
remain in the consumer's account until a vendor demands payment;62 (2) are not insured deposits if they are transferred to a
general liability account;65 (3) are not insured deposits of customers

57. See. SOLOMON, supra note 45, § 77.03[2].
58. This Article recognizes that regulatory-created competitive imbalances between banks
and non-banking corporations are likely to persist until the banking industry is significantly

deregulated. Nonetheless, the potential results of specific regulatory policies are emphasized
here because it is crucial that policy makers minimize market distortions in order to maximize
the likelihood that individual electronic currency products succeed or fail primarily based on
merit.
59. Including electronic currency in transaction accounts will not affect smaller depository
institutions with transaction account balances below the minimum threshold for reserve requirements, but larger institutions will have to maintain 10% of these funds in reserve. See 12 C.F.R.
§ 204.9.
60. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1835a. For the provision of the FDIA defining "deposit," see 12
U.S.C. § 1813(l).
61.

See FDIC General Counsel's Opinion No. 8; Stored Value Cards, 61 Fed. Reg. 40,490

(1996).
62. See id. at 40,492.
63. See id.
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if the bank is holding the funds for a third party temporarily;' and
(4) are not insured deposits if the funds are received or held by a
third party.6 5 Given that the FDIC's analytical reasoning focuses on
the location of the underlying funds, and that no distinctions are
made based on technological factors,66 it appears that this opinion
also could apply to other forms of electronic currency.
A related issue is whether insurance qualification will be affected if
the funds that support the value are held by a third party, such as a
nonbank smart card issuer or an electronic currency network
operator. The FDIC has concluded that deposit insurance would pass
through to customers who have transferred funds to a facilitator of
Internet payments, who in turn would deposit the funds in an "agency
account" at an insured depository institution.6 7 The FDIC further
has concluded that a facilitator of Internet payments would not be a
"deposit broker" under the FDIA s if the agency deposit account is
established for the primary purpose of enabling customers to buy and
sell goods and services over the Internet, rather than to obtain
increased insurance coverage.6 9 Thus, based on FDIC interpretive
letters, it is possible for electronic currency issuers to obtain federal
deposit insurance even if the funds are held in an agency account
under the nonbank issuer's name.
Despite the important rulings already handed down by the FDIC,
significant questions remain. First, if the value underlying electronic
currency is not insured by the federal government, what disclosure
requirements will be placed on issuers? Bank issuers may be required
to make disclosures that parallel those required for the retail sale of

64. This transaction is analogous to a traditional traveler's check transaction, and thus, the
funds may represent insured deposits of the third party. See id. at 40,491 (citing FDIC Staff
Advisory Op. 93-55 (Aug. 6, 1993), which found that funds held for one business day by agent
bank selling traveler's checks on behalf of company issuing traveler's checks are insured deposits
until funds are forwarded to issuing company).
65. See id. at 40,494.
66. Compare the FDIC's approach with the FRB's proposed amendments to Regulation E,
discussed infra notes 88-108 and accompanying text, which make coverage determinations for
stored value systems based on technological factors, such as whether the system operates on- or
off-line and whether the system results in extensive data capture and retention. For a discussion
of the FRB's proposed categorization of SVCs, see Mark E. Budnitz, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 1027,
1040-45 (1997).
67. See Letter fromJeffrey M. Kopchik, Counsel, FDIC 4 (Oct. 20, 1995) (on file with The
American University Law Review) (relying, in part, on 12 C.F.R. § 330.6(a), which states that funds
owned by a principal and deposited in an insured institution in the name of an agent will be
insured to the same extent as if they were deposited in the name of the principal).
68. 12 U.S.C. § 1831f(a) (1994) (prohibiting FDIC-insured depository institutions with
insufficient capital from accepting funds obtained by or through "deposit broker").
69. See Letter fromJoseph A. DiNuzzo, Acting Senior Counsel, FDIC 4 (Oct. 20, 1995) (on
file with The American University Law Review).
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other nondeposit investment products. 70 Second, will regulators
implement a federal deposit-guarantee scheme that applies to
nonbank issuers?71 At this time, this seems unlikely given: (1) the
FDIC's position that it is possible and permissible to construct a
product that is not tied to insurance; 72 and (2) the existence of
private insurance funds in the pasts and present.74 The resolution
of these issues will have a significant impact on the electronic
currency industry.
E. Escheatment
Every state has escheat laws that govern abandoned property,7 but
it is unclear whether these laws apply to the funds underlying
electronic currency. The Uniform Unclaimed Property Act of 1981
("1981 Act") 76 generally provides that "all intangible property ...
that is held, issued, or owing in the ordinary course of a holder's
business and has remained unclaimed by the owner for more than
five years ... is presumed abandoned."7 7 Property deemed abandoned then is subject to the custody of the state. 7' Thus, it appears
initially that the general provision encompasses the funds underlying
electronic currency, but the analysis is considerably more complex.
70. The four federal banking agencies-the FRB, the FDIC, the Comptroller, and the Office
of Thrift Supervision ("OTS)-issued a statement in order to provide uniform guidance to
depository institutions engaging in the retail sale of nondeposit investment products. See
Interagency Statement on Retail Sales of Nondeposit Investment Products (Feb. 15, 1994).
71. The European Commission has raised the possibility that sufficient protection of
deposits held by nonbank issuers could be assured by enlistment into a deposit-guarantee
scheme, "without all of the additional regulatory requirements of credit institutions."
Commission Policy, supranote 41, at 3.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 60-65 (discussing stored value cards).
73. Private deposit insurance, although never widespread, historically was utilized by many
industrial banks. See Randy Welch, Insurance Fund Woes Spur Run in Colorado; Crisis Seen
Worsening at Tiny Industrial Banks, Am.BANKER, Nov. 16, 1987, at 9. Industrial banks were
designed to serve the needs of blue-collar workers and were authorized to offer savings but not
checking accounts. See id. As part of its solution for the savings and loan crisis, Congress sought
to discourage the use of such insurance with the passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.).
74. In the brokerage industry, basic account insurance coverage is $500,000. Set Paul I. La
Monica, Fidelity DoublesAccount Protectionto $100M,AM. BANKER, Sept. 16, 1996, at 12. Recently,
however, Fidelity Investments, the nation's largest mutual fund company, raised the protection
of its brokerage account assets to $100 million. See id.
75. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.45.120 (Michie 1996); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1300 (West
1987 & Supp. 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3-61a (1996).
76. 8B U.L.A. 567 (1993). The 1981 Act has been adopted, in whole or in significant part,
by 34 states. See UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROPERTY AcT OF 1981, 8B U.LA table ofjurisdictions, at
92 (Supp. 1996). Its predecessors, the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Acts of 1954
and 1966, generally represent the law in eight states. See SA U.LA table ofjurisdictions, at 267
(1993 & Supp. 1996).
77. See id. § 2(a), 8B U.LA at 595.
78. See id.
§ 3, 8B U.LA. at 598.
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The application of escheat rules to electronic currency is frustrated
by the existence of a number of rules devoted to specific types of
intangible property. For example, the 1981 Act enumerates distinct
rules for: (1) traveler's checks, money orders, or similar written
instruments; 79 (2) checks or drafts issued or certified by banks;"°
(3) bank deposits; 1 and (4) gift certificates and credit memos.8 2
If an electronic currency product fails to meet any of these definitions, it may fall within the catch-all provision enacted by several
states.83 On the other hand, some courts have found the funds
underlying certain contractual relationships to be beyond the grasp
of the state's custody powers.8 4 Until an electronic currency provision is written, it will remain the issuer's task to attempt to structure
the terms of the contract to select a specific rule effectively, or
perhaps to avoid escheat altogether.
Furthermore, it is unclear what rule will control competing state
claims to abandoned electronic currency funds. Congress has
codified rules applicable only to money orders and traveler's
checks.8 5 For purposes of resolving competing state claims, sales of
money orders and traveler's checks are similar to sales of electronic
currency, given that the buyer's identity generally is unknown to the

79. See id. § 4, 8B U.L.A. at 602.
80. See id. § 5, 8B U.L . at 605.
81. See id. § 6, 8B U.LA. at 606.
82. See id. § 14, 8B U.L.A. at 625.
83. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 98.342 (1995) (using phrase "[a]ll other intangible personal
property, not otherwise covered" to create catch-all provision); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-29-111
(1993) (creating general provision for "all property... held by federal government"). Catch-all
provisions have been interpreted to include such articles as pari-mutuel ticket winnings, see
Oregon Racing Comm'n v. Mulmomah Kennel Club, 411 P.2d 63, 67 (Or. 1963), and concert
ticket refunds, see Presley v. City of Memphis, 769 S.W.2d 221, 224 (Tenn. Ct App. 1988). But
seeNorth Carolina State Treasurer v. City of Asheville, 300 S.E.2d 283, 284 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983)
(holding that unclaimed concert ticket refunds were not "abandoned" by holders, and therefore,
not subject to possession by state).
84. See, e.g., NewJersey v. Western Union Tel. Co., 110 A.2d 115, 188 (NJ. 1954) (holding
that unclaimed refunds of money orders belong to Western Union and not state, given that
relationship between Western Union and its money order purchasers was that of debtor and
creditor); NewJersey v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 153 A.2d 691, 700 (N.J. Super. Ct App. Div.
1959) (holding that proceeds from unredeemed trading stamps belong to company and not to
state, given that stamp holders did not enforce their contractual rights within period of statute
of limitations); City of Ashevie, 300 S.E.2d at 285 (reflecting on nature of contract among ticket
holder, auditorium, and performer). The court in City of Ashevile stated:
If the contract is not performed, [the ticket holder] may rescind the agreement and
demand a refund, but is not compelled to do so. Nor must the auditorium operator
The auditorium is not
or performer refund the purchase price absent a demand ....
a trustee of the unrefunded proceeds of the ticket sale; the auditorium is simply a party
to an unperformed contract.
Id.
85. See Disposition of Abandoned Money Orders and Traveler's Checks Act, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 2501-2503 (1994).
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seller. On the other hand, for those electronic currency products that
can be purchased "on-line" via the Internet, it probably would be
incorrect to conclude that "a substantial majority" of the purchasers
reside in the same states as the sellers.8 6 Thus, the predictive value
of existing federal legislation for the future resolution of interstate
controversies concerning electronic currency funds is unclear.
II.

CONSUMER PROTECTION-RELATED ISSUES

Despite the existence of broad-sweeping consumer protection
statutes at the federal and state levels," it is clear that together these
statutes do not cover all of the unique issues raised by electronic
currency. The EFTA' and Regulation E8 9 represent the primary
federal law in the area of retail EFT transactions. These rules clearly
apply to any transaction in which the consumer's account is accessed,
for example, by transferring funds from a deposit account to an SVC
at an ATM.9" The question of whether the rules apply to other
transactions involving electronic currency, such as payments to
merchants, however, is controversial and undecided. 91 In a recent
Proposed Rule and Solicitation of Comments, the FRB discussed the
issue of Regulation E coverage of stored value systems. 2 Its analysis
was framed around the delineation of four categories of such systems:
(1) off-line accountable, 9 (2) off-line unaccountable, 94 (3) on-

86. When enacting the Disposition ofAbandoned Money Orders and Traveler's Checks Act,
Congress concluded that "a substantial majority" of purchasers of such instruments reside in the
states where the purchase is made, that is, the seller's state of residency. SeeS. 2705, 93d Cong.
§ 1(2) (1974).
87. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994); 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1666j (1994);
15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681u; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r, Pub. L. No. 99-508
(codified at various sections of 18 U.S.C., primarily at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2518 (1994)); IOWA
CODE §§ 527.1-.12 (1995); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 23.1137(1)-(31) (Law. Co-op. 1996); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 58-16-1 to -18 (Michie 1996).
88. Electronic Fund Transfers Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r.
89. Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 12 C.F.R. pt. 205 (1996).
90. SeeAmendments to Regulation E, 61 Fed. Reg. 19,662, 19,669-70 (1996) (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 205) (explaining that rules apply to electronic fund transfers by financial
institutions but do not include transactions by check, wire transfer, or securities and
commodities); see also BAKER & BRANDEL, supra note 5,
12.04[4] (discussing application of
EFTA and Regulation E to debit card transactions).
91. SeeProposed Amendments to Regulation E, 61 Fed. Reg. 19,696, 19,696 (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 205) (proposed May 2, 1996).
92. See it&. at 19,703 (opining that stored value products, such as prepaid debit cards, should
be regulated by Regulation E in some circumstances, but should be exempt from "certain
provisions" of the regulation).
93. The FRB believes that these systems involve an account for EF1"A purposes, given that:
(1) the balance of funds is recorded on the card and at a central data facility; (2) there is no
authorization of transactions by communication with a database; and (3) transaction data are
periodically transmitted to and maintained by a data facility. See id. at 19,699.
94. Under these circumstances, it is more difficult to conclude that an account exists for
EFTA purposes, given that: (1) the balance of funds is maintained only on the card; (2)
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line,95 and (4) cards with a maximum value of $100.96 Although
the suitability of making analytical distinctions based on technological
or functional factors rather than on the underlying contractual
relationships between issuers and users is questionable, this Article
agrees with the logic of many of the FRB's conclusions originating
from its chosen analytical framework.
Parts A and B below provide a brief outline of the FRB's attempts

to apply Regulation E's provisions to certain electronic currency
systems. Parts C and D discuss the impact of rules that govern the

availability of customer funds and the duty of financial institutions to
"know your customer." Finally, Part E examines consumer privacy
protection laws that may tend to make distinctions between multi-unit
organizations that include a depository institution and those that do
not.
A.

Disclosure and DocumentationRequirements

The FRB's present position is that Regulation E's disclosure and
documentation requirements apply (at least in modified forms) to offline accountable and on-line stored value systems.9 7 First, due to the

relatively insignificant compliance costs that will result, institutions
that provide either off-line accountable or on-line systems will be
required to make certain relevant initial disclosures concerning
transaction charges, such as risk of loss for lost or stolen cards.98
Second, only providers of on-line systems will be required to provide
consumers with change-in-terms notices99 and transaction receipts." 0

Third, regardless of the type of system, issuers will not

transaction data are recorded on the card and captured and maintained at merchant terminals
for a short period of time; and (8) only the aggregate amount of transactions for a given period
is transmitted by the merchant to a data facility. See iU Consequently, the Board proposes to
completely exempt such systems from Regulation E. See id. at 19,702.
95. The Board believes these systems meet the EFTA definition of an account, given that:
(1) the balance of funds is maintained only at a central data facility; and (2) transactions are
authorized and recorded via communication with the data facility. See id.
96. Due to the absence of risk of large losses by users of such cards, the Board proposes to
create a de minimis exclusion for all such cards regardless of whether they operate on- or offline or are accountable or not. See id. at 19,703.
97. See id. at 19,700 (discussing benefits of compelling compliance with Regulation E's
disclosure and documentation requirements).
98. See i. (explaining that, without initial disclosure, consumers might confuse off-line
accountable stored-value products and debit or credit cards).
99. Because many off-line accountable systems do not contemplate the creation of an
ongoing relation between the issuer and the original purchaser, and because the value stored
on the card is likely to be used within a short period, the FRB believes that the costs of
compliance would outweigh consumer benefits. See id.
100. Off-line accountable systems will not be subject to transaction receipt requirements,
because: (1) many consumers may not want or need a receipt for small transactions; and (2)
many locations (e.g., vending machines) would have to be retrofitted with printers in order to
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have to provide traditional periodic statements to consumers.'0 1 If
providers of on-line systems do not supply periodic statements,
however, they will be required to 2supply the account balance and
transaction history upon request.1
B.

ErrorResolution and ConsumerLiabilityfor Unauthorized Transfers

The FRB's position with regard to error resolution and consumer
liability limitations is similar to its position on disclosures. First,
Regulation E requires financial institutions to investigate and resolve
claims of error within certain time frames, °3 but the FRB is proposing to generally exempt off-line accountable systems from these
requirements. 0 4 The only errors that issuers may be required to
resolve are those that are completely within their control, such as
malfunctioning SVCs or computer software. 0 5 Second, Regulation
E generally limits to $50 a consumer's losses for unauthorized EFT
debits, 0 6 but the FRB is planning to exempt off-line accountable
systems from this requirement as well.10 7 In contrast, on-line systems
would be subject to both error resolution requirements and consumer
08
loss limitations.1
C. Availability of Funds
It is unclear whether funds held by financial institutions in
electronic currency accounts will be subject to rules governing
availability. Regulation CC sets forth rules for financial institutions
concerning the availability of consumer funds,"° disclosure of funds

comply. See id.
101. Off-line accountable systems will be exempt because, in some of these systems,
transaction data are collected in centralized data facilities, not by the card-issuing institution.
Moreover, consumers may not need or want periodic documentation of small, commonly-made
transactions. See id.
102. See id. at 19,702 (noting that alternative of sending annual reminder of error resolution
procedures is not required for on-line stored-value systems).
103. See 12 C.F.R. § 205.11(c) (1996) (giving general guideline of no more than ten business
days for claim resolution). Typical errors include unauthorized debits, debits in an incorrect
amount, and failure to provide required identification of transactions. See id. § 205.11(a).
104. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 19,701 (commenting that compliance of off-line accountable storedvalue systems would be difficult due to time and other procedural constraints).
105. See id. (noting that such errors are not unduly difficult to correct).
106. See 12 C.F.RL § 205.6(b).
107. The FRB's decision results from the following factors: (1) such systems generally will
not require personal identification number ("PIN") protection; (2) the costs of transmitting and
storing negative files at merchant locations would be prohibitive; and (3) the amount stored on
SVCs may be substantially less than typically would be accessible through a traditional debit card.
See 61 Fed. Reg. at 19,701.
108. On-line systems, however, would be exempt from the annual error resolution notice
requirement. See id. at 19,702.
109. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 229.10-.14.
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available policies, 10 and the expeditious collection and return of
checks."' Just as they were with regard to reserve requirements," 2
non-depository institutions are beyond the reach of Regulation
CC." 3 Thus, if this regulation is applied to bank-issued electronic
currency, it seems that the competitive structure of this nascent
industry will be unbalanced further. Additionally, the decision's
negative impact would be exacerbated by the regulation's failure to
provide all purchasers of electronic currency with funds availability
protection.
D.

"Know Your Customer" Rules

"Know your customer" rules, as set forth under the Currency and
Foreign Transactions Report Act," 4 represent potential impediments
to the use of electronic currency in large value transactions." 5
Financial institutions generally are required to file a report of each
transaction of more than $10,000 that they process."' Additionally,
verification of the identity of the individual initiating the transaction
must be made by "examination of a document, other than a bank
signature card, that normally is acceptable within the banking
community as a means of identification when cashing checks for
nondepositors (e.g., a driver's license or credit card). " "' Banks,
issuers, redeemers of traveler's checks or money orders, and persons
engaged in the business of transmitting funds are subject to these
reporting requirements." 8 Thus, it appears that all issuers of
electronic currency would be subject to these rules. It is further
evident, however, that large value transactions via remote or on-line
transactions would be impossible because the rules do not provide for
an acceptable identity verification method under those circumstances.

110. See id. §§ 229.15-.18.
111. See id. §§ 229.30-.42.
112. For a discussion of the application of reserve requirements to electronic currency
issuers, see supranotes 56-59 and accompanying text.
113. Regulations CC's definition of "account" is based on Regulation D. See 12 C.F.R
§ 229.2(a) (defining "account" as "transaction account"). Transaction account is defined in 12
C.F.R. 204.2(8).
114. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5329 (1994); see also 31 C.F.R. pt. 103 (1996).
115. One could argue that because electronic currency products generally are intended to
replace micropayments, "know your customer" rules will have no impact on their development.
This Article proposes, however, that if neglected in today's discussions, these regulations may
unnecessarily divert electronic currency development away from use in large value transactions.
116. See Financial Recordkeeping and Reporting of Currency and Foreign Transactions, 31
C.F.R. § 103.22(a)(1).
117. Id § 103.28.
118. See id. § 103.11(n).
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ConsumerPrivacy

Although the emergence of electronic currency may not be
revolutionary, would-be issuers perceive an unprecedented opportunity to develop comprehensive financial services relationships with
consumers. Within some electronic currency systems, it soon may be
technologically and fiscally feasible to create consumer "profiles" that
consolidate previously dispersed information, for example, banking,
credit, medical, academic, employment, and purchasing habits. 9
Such a possibility is, of course, alarming to consumer privacy
advocates and civil libertarians and, as a result, privacy protection has
become a major issue for policy makers. 2
Consumers want to
know whether the law can assure the control of third party access to
the information contained in their personal information "profile."
Existing constitutional and statutory provisions place many restrictions
on government access to confidential information,12 and a body of

statutory and common law restricts private third party access to such
information.

22

However, current legislation that caters to the needs

119. The potential for privacy invasion is most prominent when this comprehensive customer
profile" is stored on a smart card, because: (1) a large quantity of sensitive data is maintained
with the customer outside highly sophisticated, centralized databases and thus left unprotected
by traditional security devices; and (2) if transaction information is generated and retained,
individuals can be tracked much more easily in space and time. SeeSteven A. Bercu, Smart Card
Technologies: Novel Privacy Concerns and the Legal Response, 10 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 2, 2-3 (1995).
Digital cash systems also have a unique privacy concern in that the system administrator has the
ability to read files and mail and, thus, potentially to divert customers' funds. See generally Future
ofMoney Hearings,supranote 33 (testimony ofJohnJ. Donegan, Vice President of Operations,
First Virtual Holdings, Inc.).
120. See Art Dalglish, Federal Regulators Targeting "E-Cash":. Electronic Currency Poses Complex
Issues, Asuz. REPUB., July 23, 1995, at El (noting rise in consumer use of electronic cash, but
waning ofsecurity concerns);Jeffrey Kutler, As the TechnologyAdvances, Security Debate Still Rages,
16 AM. BANKER, Dec. 23, 1996, at 6A (discussing consumers' concerns about privacy when
banking on-line).
121. Informational privacy rights are protected under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. See Bercu, supranote 119, at 3. Further, federal government access to personal
financial records maintained by financial institutions is restricted statutorily by the Right to
Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1994). Several states have enacted similar
measures limiting state and local government access to such information. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T
CODE §§ 7460-7493 (West 1995); MINN. STAT. §§ 13A.02-.04 (1995); MO. REv. STAT. §§ 408.675
to .700 (1995).
122. See, e.g., EFTA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (1994) (requiring financial institutions to give
notice to consumers of financial information disclosures made to third parties); Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1851 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., primarily at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2518) (protecting individuals
against unauthorized interception of electronic communications); see also Communications
Privacy and Consumer EmpowermentAct, H.R. 3685, 104th Cong. (1996) (proposing to require
companies to disclose what kind of information they collect about Web site visitors); 2 FOWLER
V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 9.6 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing privacy torts in general);
10 AM.JuR. 2D Banks § 332 (1963 & Supp. 1996) (discussing banks' implied contractual duty not
to disclose customer financial information to third parties).
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the privacy threats presented by
of the past does not address
3
electronic currency directly.1
Given the scale and complexity of privacy-related issues, a full
discussion of the application of existing federal and state privacy laws
to electronic currency is beyond the scope of this Article. 124 A brief
analysis of statutory, regulatory, and common law privacy provisions,
however, reveals that consumers may be better protected against
"profiling" by a multi-unit organization that contains a depository
institution than one without a depository unit. If left unamended,
these laws will disturb the competitive balance of the electronic
currency industry unnecessarily and will fail to provide a uniform level
of consumer protection against "profiling" activities.
Consumer privacy protection laws present additional situations in
which non-depository issuers of electronic currency may receive
significantly different treatment than depository institutions. The
common law relationship between a bank and its depositor is that of
debtor and creditor,'2 and generally a fiduciary or similar relationship is not recognized. 126 The legal reality, however, is that banks
are held to a high standard of confidentiality in many jurisdictions.
Various states prohibit by statute a financial institution's disclosure of
a customer's financial records unless the customer expressly has
consented to such disclosure. 27 Further, a number of courts have
accepted the proposition that a bank has an implied contractual duty
of confidentiality with regard to its depositors or customers. 28 On
the other hand, one court has held that the information-processing
activities of nonbank financial services providers will not be reviewed
under heightened scrutiny.2 9 Dissimilar regulation of the informa123. See Catherine M. Downey, The High Price of a Cashless Society: Exchanging P'ivacy Rights
for Digital Cash , 14J. MARSHALLJ. CoMPUTER & INFO. L. 303, 317-20 (1996). But cf. Data
Protection Directive, Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (stating that effective
1998, each Member State of European Community must have in place comprehensive privacy
protection program).
124. For thoughtful discussions of privacy and electronic banking and commerce, see Alan
F. Westin, Discussion Paper for Meetings on Technology and Finance, sponsored by the New
York Academy of Sciences, Feb.-Apr., 1996; Downey, supra note 123; Bercu, supra note 119.
125. See9 CJ.S. Banks and Banking § 270 (1996).
126. See id. § 248.
127. See, e.g., 205 ILL. ComP. STAT. 5/48.1 (West 1996); MD.CODE ANN., FIN. INST. §§ 1-301
to -305 (1992 & Supp. 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 6-08.1-01 to -08 (1995).
128. See, e.g., Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'i Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 290 (Idaho 1961) ("It is
implicit in the contract of the bank with its customer or depositor that no information may be
disclosed.., unless authorized by law or by the customer or depositor .... ); Indiana Nat'i
Bank v. Chapman, 482 N.E.2d 474, 482 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that banks implidly
contract duty of confidentiality unless public duty arises).
129. See Dwyer v. American Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1354-56 (Il1. App. Ct. 1995)
(holding defendant charge card issuer not liable to customers for invasion of privacy claims
arising from compiling and renting of customer lists segmented by spending habits and
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tion sharing activities of banks and nonbanks active in the electronic
currency industry represent yet another potential competitive inequity
that results in a failure to provide all consumers with the degree of
privacy protection that seems to be the goal of relevant statutory
measures.
The dissemination of customer information for credit assessment
purposes is governed by statutes that will restrict the ability of all
issuers of electronic currency to share customer information. A
common commercial practice is for affiliated companies to include in
their agreements with customers an authorization statement that
allows them to share customer information freely. However, no
commercial enterprise can contract around the Fair Credit Reporting
Act's disclosure and verification of information requirements. °
Further, state credit information disclosure restrictions also affect
banks and nonbanks similarly because banks generally are allowed to
disclose customer financial records if they do so as an exchange of
Thus, credit
credit information in the regular course of business.'
to
same
protection
information disclosure laws appear to afford the
consumers regardless of whether electronic currency is purchased
from a nonbanking corporation.

III. FACILITATING LEGAL EXPECTATIONS-A PARADIGM FOR POLICY
The ideal plan for guiding the development of electronic currency
law-taking into account issues of fairness, efficiency, and prudence-should not focus on regulating issuing institutions or
protecting consumer interests, but on facilitating the crystallization of
issuer and user expectations in emerging payment systems. Before
acquiring an interest in electronic currency, users (i.e., consumers
and merchants) should possess expectations concerning the rights
and obligations assumed via these transactions. As issuer and user
expectations mature and legal uncertainties subside, electronic
currency systems will be able to compete with each other and with
existing systems based on merit and utility (e.g., convenience, safety,
ease of use), rather than on relative levels of legal certainty. The
groundwork for our proposal is an evaluation of sources of legal
expectations for existing payment systems.

shopping preferences).
130. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1994).
131. For examples of state statutes with a "regular course of business" exception, see 205 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/48.1(b) (6); MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST. § 1-303(7) (1992); N.D. CENr. CODE § 6.
08.1-02(6) (1995).
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It is important to note that this Article's proposal for the development of electronic currency law is constrained by two premises. First,
the law should not stifle or steer without reason future technological
development. Much of the pioneering technological innovation and
market viability testing of electronic currency has been the result of
the efforts of non-depository institutions. 2 Therefore, broadsweeping preemptive regulations, such as those that would restrict
issuance authority to regulated financial institutions, would restrict
future innovation unnecessarily.13 3 Further, regulations that focus
heavily on technological distinctions between payment systems would
be unwise, because: (1) it is likely that such distinctions will become
antiquated quickly in this fast-paced industry; and (2) such distinctions fail to consider the substance of the underlying relationship
between the parties.
Second, we recognize the need to manage risk to the integrity of
the existing payment system effectively. If electronic currency reaches
a state of mass dissemination, a chain reaction of issuer bankruptcy or
failure could lead to a critical disruption in commerce. Full-scale
preemptive legal action designed to protect the safety and soundness
of the payment system, however, is likely to be unnecessary until a
more cognizable threat arises.
"Cash" offers little aid to the development of legal expectations for
electronic currency. United States coins and currency, or "cash,"
provide users with perhaps the most confidence and the most clearly
defined expectations of any means of exchange. Foremost, user
confidence in cash originates from the guarantee of the full faith and
credit of the U.S. government. United States cash is unique in that
it can be used as legal tender for all debts both public and private."M
If the federal government were to issue an electronic
version of U.S. currency patterned after cash that has a very low
likelihood of malfunctioning, it likely would gain wide acceptance

132. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text (describing new developments in electronic
currency).
133. United States policy makers generally appear to agree that preemptive regulation carries
a high risk of negative consequences. See, e.g., Edward W. Kelley, Member, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, Remarks at CyberPayments '96 Conference 2 (June 18, 1996)
("Heavy-handed, preemptive attempts at regulating these products and the competitive process
before significant social risks have been demonstrated would likely handicap innovation for no
compelling reason."); Eugene A. Ludwig, Remarks at Conference on Digital Commerce '96, at
5 (May 6, 1996) ("I certainly do not believe that government should focus on these new
technologies with some Luddite-like desire to stop progress-quite the contrary.").
134. "United States coins and currency are legal tender for all debts, public charges, and
dues." 31 U.S.C. § 5103 (1994).
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fairly quickly. 5 Electronic currency issuers cannot offer a truly
cash-like product, however, because: (1) they may violate criminal
prohibitions against issuing currency intended to compete with that
of the United States; 3 6 and (2) no payment product can attain the
37
status of legal tender without the endorsement of Congress.
Thus, private issuers and legal policy makers must look elsewhere for
a source of electronic currency users' legal expectations.
Payment instruments that provide access to traditional deposit
accounts also provide limited aid to the development of electronic
currency law. Unlike cash, the legal expectations surrounding
payment instruments that facilitate access to deposit accounts, such as
paper checks and ATM cards, are not derived from a guarantee of
payment by the U.S. government. People that issue, write, and accept
checks or point of sale ("POS") debit payments, however, generally
can expect that a payment will be sent and received." These wellsettled expectations exist for a number of reasons: (1) checks are
issued by regulated financial institutions that are subject to supervision and examination; (2) the underlying value represents a federally
insured deposit; and (3) payment orders are processed by a clearing
system with established practices. If electronic currency issuers
analogize their products to deposit-backed payment systems in an
attempt to utilize this foundation of expectations, it would be more
appropriate to classify these emerging products as "electronic checks"
and generally to subject them to existing banking regulations. On the
other hand, issuers may structure issuances as the creation of a
contract for the right to acquire goods, services, or cash, rather than
the formation of a deposit account. Under this approach, it would be
proper to look beyond banking laws that are designed specifically to
govern bank-depositor relationships, to other potential sources of
legal analogy.
Perhaps the best source of guidance for lawmakers and issuers of
electronic currency is the evolution of the traveler's check, which has

135. The U.S. Mint has attempted to convince the Clinton administration to consider a
government-issued "legal tender" SVC. See U.S. Mint Eyes Government's Own Stored Value Card, 15
BANKING POLy' RE'., Mar. 4-18, 1996, at 14, 14. But see Kelley, supra note 133, at 8 ("I do not
anticipate that the Federal Reserve will seek to provide a new retail electronic payment product

136. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (describing prohibitions of Stamp
Payments Act of 1862).
137. See 31 U.S.C. § 5103 (limiting legal tender to U.S. coins and currency).

138. Payment by personal check only suspends an obligation rather than discharging it

completely, and thus, in the event that a payment order is rejected by a bank for reasons such
as insufficient funds, payees know that the banking system provides an established channel of
recourse.
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managed to flourish despite early (and somewhat persisting)
uncertainty concerning its legal status. The U.C.C. makes clear that
the traveler's check may be a negotiable instrument'8 9 when it has
been completed with a countersignature." 4 In all other circumstances, however, it is unclear whether the U.C.C. is applicable to
traveler's checks at all. They could be money, a negotiable instrument, or a mere contract.'41 This uncertainty is provocative rather
than repulsive, because it clearly demonstrates that payment instruments do not need a comprehensive set of directly applicable positive
laws in order to succeed in the marketplace.
It is unclear, however, whether electronic currency issuers will be
able to duplicate the traveler's check experience. The traveler's
check has thrived, in large part, because issuers often absorb losses
rather than assert possible defenses against redemption."
Users'
confidence that issuing institutions, such as American Express and
Thomas Cook, will stand behind these instruments has fostered the
development of marketplace expectations, if not legal expectations.
These institutions cannot provide expectations concerning enforceable legal rights beyond those based in contract, but their longstanding operating practices provide a wealth of practical expectations
to their customers. Although it is questionable whether electronic
currency issuers, such as CyberCash and DigiCash, are capable of
independently generating the level of institutional confidence
necessary to create widespread market acceptance of their payment
systems, it is possible that a privately-created system of rules could
form the foundation of legal expectations from which market viability
progresses.
Although credit cards may facilitate transactions that are economically different from stored-value-based electronic currency transactions, the development of credit card laws may provide a useful
blueprint for electronic currency. From the beginning of the credit
card industry, MasterCard and Visa were permitted significant leeway
to develop a private law of credit cards that slowly has evolved and
generally has been integrated into public law. The issuers established

139. To be negotiable, an instrument must: (1) be written; (2) be signed by the maker or
drawer; (3) contain an unconditional promise or an unconditional order to pay; (4) be payable
in a sum certain in money; (5) be payable on demand or at a definite time; (6) be payable to
the order of a designated person or to the bearer. See U.C.C. § 3-104 (1990).
140. See id. § 3-104(i). A traveler's check derives its safety benefits from a signaturecountersignature system. The user signs the check at the time of purchase and then
countersigns it at the time of cashing. See id.
141. See Hawkland, supra note 31, at 522.

142. See id. at 517.

1130

THE AMERICAN UNrvERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1105

rules governing internal practices; they contracted relatively freely
with merchants and consumers; and they generally settled any
disputes among member institutions without resorting to litigation.
These established trade practices are what provided credit cards with
the requisite set of expectations for market viability.
Moreover, electronic currency issuers are situated similarly to the
first credit card issuers in that they possess superior knowledge of the
technology and a vision for how their ideal payment system should
function. The emergence of electronic currency may represent a
process in which step-by-step development of necessary legal measures
is better carried out by private parties who are involved with the
development of the technology intimately.
CONCLUSION

The legal environment for electronic currency should include a
minimum level of targeted regulation. Action should be focused
principally on protection of the existing payment system, the safety
and soundness of issuers, and basic consumer protection. Given (1)
that estimates of the likely growth of electronic currency are negligible compared to the size of the entire monetary aggregate; (2) the
vital contributions being made by non-depository institutions to the
technological and market development of electronic currency; and
(3) the existence of money transmitter or similar laws that probably
will ensure the soundness of electronic currency issuers, no preemptive legal regulation should be implemented before a clear threat is
discernable. Consumer protection proposals that appear to disregard
the lack of a traditional deposit account underlying many electronic
currency relationships are improper. General consumer protection
measures should be applied to electronic currency, instead of banking
laws that were designed to govern the bank-depositor relationship.
This bare-bones superstructure for electronic currency law should
be supplemented as necessary by analogy to existing payment systems
and by private contract. The strength of the common law has been
demonstrated under similar circumstances, such as the traveler's
check and credit card industries. The emergence of electronic
currency seems to present lawmakers and industry participants with
an opportunity to employ this strength once again.

